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Abstract
We develop a two period family decision making model in which spouses bar-
gain over their contributions to a family public good and the distribution of private
consumption. In contrast to most models in the literature, specialization within the
couple emerges endogenously from the production of the public good, and is not
caused by exogenous diﬀerences between the spouses. Increasing marginal beneﬁts
of labour market experience make specialization eﬃcient, even if both spouses have
equal market and household productivities on the outset. If spouses are not able to
enter into a binding contract governing the distribution of private consumption in the
second period, the spouse specialized in market labour cannot commit to compen-
sate the other spouse for foregone investments in earnings power. As a consequence,
this spouse may withdraw part of his/her contribution and the provision level of the
household good is likely to be ineﬃciently low.
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Do couples always make eﬃcient decisions regarding labour supply, fertility and consump-
tion? For the pioneer of family economics, Gary Becker, the answer was clearly yes. Since,
in his “unitary model”, the altruistic head of the household has the power to determine
intrafamily allocation, there is no need to deal with diﬀering preferences within the house-
hold. The family decision making problem collapses to the decision making problem of one
rational individual and is therefore eﬃcient.1
In this paper, we show how allowing for a distributional conﬂict between the spouses
can generate an ineﬃcient outcome of the family decision making process. We develop
a simple two period model, in which spouses bargain over the provision level of a family
public good and the division of private consumption between the spouses. The family
public good is produced at home, with spouses’ time as the only input, while private
consumption results from labour market work. We emphasize the importance of labour
market experience as a determinant of wage rates. Based on recent ﬁndings in empirical
labour economics, we make an assumption about the speciﬁc functional form linking labour
market experience and wage rates. This allows us to show that specialization in household
and market production within the couple is eﬃcient, even if spouses are equally productive
in both spheres ex-ante. Unlike most models in the literature, we do not need to rely on
biological diﬀerences or labour market discrimination against women to account for the
widespread gender division of labour still observed in most industrialized countries. This
division of labour arises endogenously as a consequence of the provision of the public good.
It leads to diﬀerent levels of investment in human capital within the couple, which in turn
leads to spouses having diﬀerent wage rates in the second period.
Provided the couple can reach a binding agreement about the distribution of their
resources over the course of their whole married life, the spouse who suﬀers from a lower
wage rate due to the provision of the family public good is compensated by the other
spouse. In this case, the outcome of the family decision making process is eﬃcient.
If, on the other hand, binding agreements across periods are not feasible, the eﬃcient
degree of specialization may not be time-consistent. There is an asymmetry between
market and household work. Working in the labour market leads to a higher wage rate in
the second period while producing the public good does not. Therefore, the public good
provider suﬀers from a lower consumption level in the second period. This may cause an
underprovision of the public good, because the spouse specialized in market work cannot
credibly commit to compensate her or his partner for their lower wage rate in the second
period.
The model starts with “young marriage”, when the couple establishes their ﬁrst joint
1Among the many contributions of Becker to the theory of the family, see e. g. Becker (1965, 1981).
2household, and family public goods become relevant.2 Not only every-day household work
is a public good for the couple, but also the beneﬁts of long-term investments like the
rearing of children or the building of a house are enjoyed jointly by both spouses. This
is what we have in mind when we talk about the production of a family public good,
which requires the spouses’ time as an input. Naturally, the time devoted to household
production goes at the expense of other activities, most prominently the building of a
professional career. The age at which most couples have children and build their houses
coincides with the stage in life in which most market related human capital is accumulated
and careers progress in a most decisive way, playing a crucial role in lifetime earnings and
in later income patterns. We incorporate this tradeoﬀ by assuming learning by doing in
the labour market. The more an individual works in the market and invests in his or her
professional career, the more productive she/he becomes. Or, conversely, the more time an
individual spends producing the household public good, the more she/he forgoes present
and future income at the labour market. In line with empirical ﬁndings, we assume this
eﬀect to become weaker the longer the absence from the labour market.
In the second period, the couple is established (e.g., the children have grown up and left
home, the house is built). We assume that there is no household public good consumption
and that both spouses devote themselves entirely to their careers.
In both periods, spouses determine the distribution of private consumption via Nash
bargaining. In this solution concept, the utilities the spouses could guarantee themselves if
they were unable to reach an agreement - the threat or disagreement points - are of crucial
importance for the distribution of private consumption goods. We devote special attention
to spouses’ threat points, since there is no consensus in the literature as to what is likely
to be used as a threat point in family bargaining. Two quite diﬀerent speciﬁcations have
been proposed so far. In the classic models of Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy
and Horney (1981), spouses divorce and live as singles. Alternatively, they may stay
together, but resort to non-cooperative behaviour within marriage (Lundberg and Pollak
(1993) and Konrad and Lommerud (2000) are examples of this strand of literature). We
compare both threat point speciﬁcations to assess their relevance. It turns out that the
two diﬀerent threat points “favor” diﬀerent spouses, so the choice of the threat point does
have distributional consequences.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the related literature.
Then we present the model and its main assumptions. Section 4 derives the eﬃcient
Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) if binding agreements across periods are feasible and
discusses the two threat point speciﬁcations as well as their implications for the distribution
2 While we use the term “marriage” throughout the text, the model applies to any form of cohabitation
or partnership that involves a major joint project. Also other settings outside the economics of the family
are imaginable, like a partnership of ﬁrms contributing to R & D as a public good in a ﬁrst stage of a
2-stage-game.
3of resources within the couple. Section 5 analyzes the model if spouses cannot commit
across time periods. We describe possible ineﬃcient outcomes and discuss potential policy
implications of the model. Section 6 summarizes our results and concludes.
2 Related Literature
The family bargaining literature was pioneered by Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy
and Horney (1981). They allowed for a conﬂict of interest within the household, and
proposed that spouses resort to Nash Bargaining to settle their diﬀerences.3 In Nash
bargaining models, household decision making is eﬃcient by assumption - this is often
motivated by the presumption that spouses can make binding and enforceable agreements
that enable them to reach eﬃcient outcomes.
While it is arguable that family decision making is eﬃcient on an everyday basis, it is
not clear how families should make binding contracts about intra-household distribution
over long time horizons.4 Recent literature shows that ineﬃcient family decision mak-
ing can arise in models that contain more than one period and evolve around decisions
that inﬂuence future “bargaining power”. Lundberg and Pollak (2003) discuss the deci-
sion whether to migrate or to stay put. They ﬁnd that if the couple is unable to reach
a binding agreement over the division of marital resources before making a location deci-
sion, ineﬃcient divorce or ineﬃcient migration choices by the couple may be the outcome.
Another decision that is likely to inﬂuence future “bargaining power” is the educational
choice. If one spouse has a higher education, and therefore a higher wage rate, than the
other, eﬃciency demands that this spouse specializes in market work, while the other per-
forms most of the “housework” (the production of family public goods). But specialization
decisions are typically not neutral with respect to “bargaining power”. Being more produc-
tive in the provision of a public good is not necessarily an advantage in a non-cooperative
setting (Buchholz and Konrad, 1995). In Konrad and Lommerud (2000) spouses invest
non-cooperatively in education before marriage. Then they marry and in the second pe-
riod they may behave non-cooperatively or they may cooperate with the equilibrium of the
non-cooperative game as the threat point. Both spouses have an incentive to ineﬃciently
overinvest in education (i. e., their productivity in market work), because a higher wage
rate improves their bargaining position in the second stage (whether directly in the private
provision game or indirectly via the fall-back utility in the Nash bargaining game).5
3Another important strand of the family economics literature stresses the importance of household
production and trade within the household, see Apps and Rees (1988, 1996). The “collective” model of
Chiappori (1988) does not specify a decision making process, but suggests that family decision making
leads to eﬃcient outcomes. In this paper we focus on the bargaining approach.
4Note that prenuptial agreements ﬁx the distribution of resources in the case of divorce, but rarely
within marriage.
5Vagstad (2001) proposes a similar model where the spouses do not invest in education valuable on the
4In these models, investment in earnings power is investment in education that predates
marriage. The educational choice is purely strategic, it is taken in order to improve one’s
bargaining position by aiming to alter relative productivities within the couple to one’s
favor. In our model, in contrast, specialization within the couple occurs as a consequence of
the provision of the public good, and not in its strategic anticipation. Unequal investment
in human capital results endogenously as a consequence of the private provision of the
household public good. Also, the main reason for the ineﬃciency of the bargaining outcome
in our model is not the diﬀerent eﬀect of household- and market skills on bargaining power
as in these models, but the fact that spouses are credit constrained.
Ott (1992) was one of the ﬁrst to analyze a dynamic model of intrafamily distribution
that produces an ineﬃcient outcome. Her model is related to ours because it also incor-
porates learning by doing on the labour market. In a similar way, Gugl (2006) analyzes
the eﬀects of the taxation of couples on labour supply and intra-family distribution when
there is learning by doing in the labour market. She also considers diﬀerent threat point
speciﬁcations. In a more recent contribution, Gugl (2009) revisits the issue of joint versus
individual taxation of couples in a dynamic bargaining model, were spouses choose their
labour supply non-cooperatively in the ﬁrst period, and use the Nash Bargaining solution
only in the second period. She also examines the role of control over labour supply - i.e.
if both spouses have the power to chose their own labour supply - for intra-household
distribution. In these two contributions, the reason for a subeﬃcient provision level of the
public good is that spouses manipulate their bargaining position in the second period by
working too much in the labour market in the ﬁrst period to enhance their productivity.
Lundberg (2002) considers a similar model with learning by doing in the labour market.
Her focus is on family policy and she does not explicitly model family decision making,
but household utility is a weighted average of individual utilities.
Reiner (2008) uses the framework of Konrad and Lommerud (2000) to analyze whether
specialization between men and women in the household and in the labour market are
reinforced by gender discrimination in the labour market. He assumes that women have
an exogenous advantage in household production. This exogenous diﬀerence in relative
productivity between the spouses leads to unequal intra-household bargaining positions;
the husband’s advantage in intrahousehold bargaining may lead to an ineﬃcient household
allocation. Our paper complements this approach by showing that ineﬃciency can be due
to long-term commitment problems, even if husband and wife have equal productivities on
the outset.
All the models quoted above assume exogenously that spouses have diﬀering produc-
tivities in household and market work (otherwise, specialization within the couple would
not be eﬃcient). We do not need such an assumption. In contrast, our model, special-
ization arises endogenously due to the provision of the public good even if both spouses
labour market, but in household production skills. Asymmetric household productivity is assumed.
5have identical productivities at the beginning of marriage.6 Thus, our model extends the
existing literature by analyzing specialization between spouses that are ex-ante identical
and leading endogenously to an asymmetric ex-post outcome. This suggests a diﬀerent
source of ineﬃciency - contract and credit constraints - as opposed to strategic motives
(inﬂuencing future threat points), that have dominated the literature so far.
3 The Model
Consider a household consisting of two spouses, i = f;m, whose lifespan stretches over
two periods. In both periods, the spouses’ time endowment is ﬁxed and normalized to 1.
In period 1, which can be thought of as “young marriage”, spouses f and m allocate their
time between household work producing the family public good G, which can be thought
of as raising children or building a house, and market work. In the second period, spouses
devote all their time to market work and only consume the private good. 7 The spouses’




1 + v(G) + c
i
2; i = f;m; (1)
where ci
j, i = f;m, j = 1;2 denotes the private consumption of spouse i in period j,
and v(G) is the utility the spouses derive from the public good G. The function v(G) is
monotonically increasing, concave, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable. Thus, lifetime
utility is quasilinear and intertemporally linear.8 For the sake of simplicity there is no
leisure and no discounting, therefore lifetime utility is the sum of the utilities of both
periods. Further, we assume that spouses do not have access to the capital market, there
is no borrowing and no saving.9
The public good is produced in the ﬁrst period with the spouses’ time as the only input
according to the linear technology G = hfgf + hmgm, where gi, i = f;m are her and his
contributions to G, and hi, i = f;m are her and his productivities in household production,
respectively. 10 Throughout the paper we will assume, without loss of generality, that the
6For the sake of a complete analysis, we also consider the case of unequal partners.
7Having no public good in the second period allows focusing on the commitment eﬀect of the public
good provision in the ﬁrst period. Konrad and Lommerud (2000) have analyzed the case of public good
provision in the second period and the corresponding strategic behaviour in the ﬁrst period.
8 This special form of utility is quite restrictive, but it is commonplace in the literature to restrict the
analysis to special utility functions for the sake of analytical tractability. Lundberg and Pollak (1993)
assume a Stone-Geary utility function, Konrad and Lommerud (2000) work with a quasilinear “payoﬀ”
function and Vagstad (2001) analyzes the case of Cobb Douglas preferences with equal coeﬃcients for the
public and the private good. We chose this quasilinear formulation because in our Nash bargaining setting
the utility possibility frontier (the locus of all Pareto eﬃcient utility pairs) is linear and utility is easily
transferable between the spouses, which greatly simpliﬁes the formal analysis, see Bergstrom (1997).
9 For a discussion of this assumption, see section 5.3.
10 This household production technology where time inputs of husband and wife are perfect substitutes
6wife is at least as productive in the household as the husband, hf  hm (note that this
involves the case of equal household productivities as a border case).11
The private consumption good ci
j is purchased with the income the spouses earn on
the labour market whenever they are not busy producing the family public good. On the
outset, spouses have the same market productivity given by the wage rate w. Private
consumption in the ﬁrst period is
c
f





1 = w  (1   g
m)   P
1 (3)
where 1   gi is the time spent on market work, and P 1 is a transfer from husband to wife
in period 1 (which of course can also be negative). In period 2, spouses devote all their











where their wage rate depends on their ﬁrst period labour supply and P 2 is the second
period transfer.
3.1 Learning by doing in the labour market
Labour market experience acquired in period 1 increases the wage rate in period 2. Equiv-
alently, time spent in household production in the ﬁrst period decreases the market pro-
ductivity in the second period, so the wage function w(gi) is decreasing. Furthermore,
the (negative) marginal productivity eﬀect of an additional time unit spent in household
production (i.e. not on the labour market) decreases with the total duration of that indi-
vidual’s absence from the labour market, i. e., the marginal productivity eﬀects of gi are
diminishing.
To illustrate this assumption, consider the marginal eﬀect of one additional year of
maternity leave on the mother’s wage rate. Whether she takes one or two years oﬀ following
the birth of her child has a relatively big (adverse) eﬀect on her career, but whether she
stays away from the labour market for seven or eight years does not make a big diﬀerence
was proposed by Becker (1981), who argued that “at the beginning everyone is identical; diﬀerences in
eﬃciency are not determined by biological or other intrinsic diﬀerences” (Becker, 1981, p.32).
11 We want to stress that we do not resort to any kind of exogenous or biological argument here. We
want to allow for the case that one partner has a comparative advantage in household production and we
consider equal productivities as the border case. The direction of the inequality is a matter of indexation
only and could as well be reversed.
7anymore.12 If an individual devotes all her/his time to market work, the highest possible
wage in period 2 is given by a ﬁxed, ﬁnite wage w := w(0). The lowest possible wage is
denoted by w := w(1).
Thus, w(gi) is a monotonically decreasing, convex and twice continuously diﬀerentiable
function, w0(gi) < 0, w00gi) > 0 for gi 2 [0;1]. This is a crucial assumption of our model,
which we believe to be both plausible and supported by the empirical data.
3.2 Time structure
We consider a two period model with the following structure.
1. The ﬁrst period is young marriage. In this phase, the couple chooses the contributions
to G. We assume that the couple decides cooperatively via Nash bargaining on the
size of this investment, on the spouses’ labour supply and on the distribution of the
private consumption good between the partners. Spouses have two possible threat
points when bargaining:
(a) Non-cooperative marriage as threat point: Spouses contribute privately to the
family public good.
(b) Divorce as threat point: Spouses evaluate their utilities as being life-time singles.
2. In the second period there is no public good to be provided and both spouses devote
all their time to market work, i. e., to private consumption. Again, Nash bargaining
determines the allocation of goods within marriage.
We will consider two versions of this model. First, as a benchmark, we look at the
outcome if spouses can enter into a binding contract at the beginning of marriage that
12The assumption that the wage decreases at a decreasing rate in the time devoted to household pro-
duction corresponds to the assumption that the returns to learning by doing increase at an increasing rate.
It is based on several recent empirical contributions that suggest that the relationship between wages and
time invested in one’s earnings power (be it in education or work experience) is non-linear. Regarding
education, Mincer (1997), Deschênes (2006) and Lemieux (2006b,a) all ﬁnd a convex wage function of
education. Lemieux (2006a) argues that especially time invested in postsecondary education increases the
wage rate in an overproportional way. With respect to work experience, Beblo and Wolf (2002) analyze
the eﬀect of job leaves on wages by modeling a convex wage function, which is supported by their data.
Schönberg and Ludsteck (2007) analyze the eﬀect of several expansions in the duration of maternity leave
in Germany on women’s wages. They ﬁnd that an expansion in job-protected leave from 2 to 6 months
that took place in 1979 signiﬁcantly decreased wages, while subsequent expansions from 6 to 10 months in
1986 and from 18 to 36 months in 1992 did not lower wages signiﬁcantly. Although some of these papers
focus on the eﬀects of education and not on work experience, the relevant aspect in the context of our
model is whether an individual invests her/his time in her/his own career and human capital (be it work
experience or further education) or whether (s)he contributes to the household public good instead.
8stipulates private consumption in both periods. Then, in section 5, we relax this assump-
tion and assume that spouses have to renegotiate the distribution of private consumption
in period 2.
4 Binding agreements are feasible
As a reference point for our analysis, in this section we look at the model if the couple can
enter into a binding contract at the beginning of period 1, that determines both the level
of the public good provision (including who provides it) and the distribution of private
consumption in periods 1 and 2.
The NBS is, by construction, eﬃcient, and lies on the boundary of the couple’s utility
possibility set, the Utility Possibility Frontier (UPF). Quasilinear utility implies that the
UPF is linear in the relevant region where both spouses consume positive quantities of
public and private goods. The couple’s UPF and the NBS are depicted in Figure 1, where
the eﬃcient NBS is found at the tangency point of the UPF and the curve representing
the Nash product.13 The optimal provision level of the public good is unique, while the
division of the private consumption good is determined by spouses’ threat point utilities.
4.1 Eﬃcient outcome
We can treat the two periods of the model as one because we assume binding contracts
across periods. The eﬃcient outcome is found by maximizing the sum of the spouses’
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In order to have a non-trivial problem, we assume that each spouse consumes a positive
amount of both the public and the private good if (s)he were single, 0 < gi < 1 for i = f;m.
Equivalently, the marginal utility of the ﬁrst unit of time devoted to the public good G is
suﬃciently large and the marginal wage eﬀect of the last unit of time devoted to market
13The UPF is non linear in its border regions, where private consumption is zero for one spouse. If one
of the spouses controls all private consumption goods, he or she can further increase his or her utility only
by decreasing the level of public good provision below the socially optimal level. Any reduction beyond
his or her individually optimal provision level decreases both utilities. This results in the concave borders
of the UPF as depicted in Figure 1. Because both spouses consume public and private goods at the threat
points and control their own income, the NBS will never lie on these borders.
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Figure 1: The eﬃcient outcome
work is suﬃciently small for both spouses i = f;m:
v
0(0)h





i < w   w
0(1): (8)
Note that the second of these Inada conditions states that, at the solution of the couple’s
joint maximization problem, the sum of the contributions to the public good gf + gm is
smaller than 1. This condition also implies that each spouse on her or his own would
never spend all available time in household production. Additionally, we assume that









i 2 [0;1]: (9)
These assumptions guarantee that the individual maximization problem does not have a
trivial (corner) solution and that the second order conditions for both individual and joint
utility maximization are satisﬁed. We say that an individual i is fully specialized if (s)he
devotes all of her/his time in the ﬁrst period to one type of work (market or household
work), that is, if gi = 0 or gi = 1.
10Proposition 1 (Eﬃciency)
In the eﬃcient solution, one spouse is fully specialized on market work while the other
spouse divides his or her time between market work and household production. If hf > hm,
it is the husband who specializes in market work. If hf = hm either spouse can specialize
in market work.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is that, in the ﬁrst period, both spouses have the same
wage rate, so they face the same direct cost of providing the public good. In terms of second
period consumption, though, the ﬁrst unit of the public good is the most expensive. This
is due to the convex wage function. Therefore, it cannot be optimal to equally split the
time they want to devote to household production, since both spouses would then suﬀer
the expensive ﬁrst units of wage loss. This is true for couples with identical productivities.
If, on top of that, the wife has a comparative advantage in household production, it is
optimal that she becomes the sole provider of the household public good and that the
husband specializes in market work.
This full specialization result also depends on the simple payoﬀ functions assumed.
One can think of many, more sophisticated payoﬀ functions that do not lead to full spe-
cialization; e. g. a payoﬀ function where spouses’ contributions to the public good are not
perfect substitutes. However, it is our aim to keep the speciﬁcation as simple as possible
to focus on the spouses’ inability to sign a binding agreement. Anticipating the discus-
sion in Section 5.2, the chosen speciﬁcation makes, in general, an ineﬃcient outcome less,
and not more likely. In addition, our approach avoids exogenous assumptions on gender
speciﬁc productivity diﬀerences. Instead we oﬀer an explanation as to why specialization
according to gender persists, even though both genders are equally capable at performing
household and labour market tasks.
Proposition 1 shows that specialization is eﬃcient because it minimizes the joint cost
of the provision of the public good. Although it does not matter which spouse specializes
if spouses are equally productive, for notational convenience and without loss of generality
we will assume that the wife is the public good provider, i. e., G = hfgf;gm = 0.
The ﬁrst order condition for the eﬃcient provision level of the public good is found by





f) = 2  h
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0(G) = w   w
0(g
f): (10)
The distribution of private consumption in the NBS is determined by spouses’ relative
threat point utilities, denote them by T f and T m. The higher a spouses’ utility in the
event of disagreement, the larger the share of resources that spouse can claim. Along
the linear region of the UPF, the socially optimal amount of the public good is provided,
and only the distribution of the private consumption good varies. In this region, spouses
bargain over the partition of a “gains from marriage cake” of ﬁxed size. In such a setting,
11the NBS guarantees each spouse their threat point utility, and the remaining surplus is










U   T f   T m
2
: (11)
Unlike the husband, the wife works in household production, so she bears the resulting
cost alone. At the NBS, she has to receive a transfer payment to ensure that she reaches
the utility level guaranteed to her in (11). In the ﬁrst period, she receives a transfer P 1 to
make up for her direct income loss, while in the second period, a payment P 2 compensates
her for her lower wage rate. In the following, let Uf m := Uf   Um denote the utility
diﬀerence between wife and husband and T f m := T f T m denote the diﬀerence between
the threat point utilities of wife and husband, which we will also call the wife’s utility edge
at the threat point. The transfers are calculated by subtracting the wife’s utility level at
the optimal household production level gf without the transfer, U(gf), from the utility




































where in expression (12), Uf m is evaluated at the eﬃcient level of gf.
In the following, we will lay out in detail the two threat point speciﬁcations we consider,
non-cooperative marriage (NC) and divorce (D), and calculate the transfers corresponding
to each threat point. As will become clear, the two speciﬁcations “favor” diﬀerent spouses.15
4.2 Non-cooperative marriage as threat point
In the non-cooperative marriage threat point the couple live together without coordinating
their actions. They play a non-cooperative private-provision of a public good game, that
is, each spouse maximizes his/her utility, taking the behaviour of their partner as given,






























14 Remember that gf denotes the eﬃcient contribution to the public good and that Uf denotes not
only the eﬃcient outcome, but additionally the NBS. So, if the wife provides the public good, U(gf) < Uf
because of the transfer.
15 Note that the threat point is exogenously given in our setting, and cannot be chosen by the spouses.
























with equality if gi > 0. The left hand side (LHS) is the marginal utility of an additional
unit of the public good, while the right hand side (RHS) represents the marginal cost of
that unit in forgone units of private consumption. Spouses not only take the direct cost
of their home time into account (w on the RHS), but also the lower wage rate a marginal
unit of household work has as a consequence in the second period (w0(gi
NC) on the RHS).
Lemma 1 (Non-cooperative marriage as threat point)




NC. If the wife is more productive in the household than her husband,




NC = 0. Moreover, the wife spends less time in household production in




Now we can explicitly calculate the transfer payments the wife receives at the NBS if




NC diﬀer for the cases hf > hm and hf = hm, we will consider them separately.
Asymmetric productivities hf > hm. The wife’s provision level of the public good at
the non cooperative threat point g
f
NC is determined by (15) holding with equality, while

















































NC)   w(0)) < 0
where the last equality results from the husband free-riding on his wife’s public good
provision in the non-cooperative marriage game. Expression (17) is negative, reﬂecting
the fact that with non-cooperative marriage as the threat point, the husband is at least as
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f)] > 0: (19)
13The ﬁrst period transfer P 1
NC is positive, because the eﬃcient contribution to the public
good is larger than the non-cooperative contribution, gf > g
f
NC. The second period
transfer P 2
NC is also positive because the wage is decreasing in the amount of time invested
in the public good, w(g
f
NC) > w(gf). With P 1
NC, the husband compensates the wife for
half of the time she worked more in the cooperative outcome than she would have done in
the absence of an agreement, thus foregoing labour income. P 2
NC compensates her for half
of her associated wage loss.
The outcome is not “fair” in the sense that spouses share equally in the provision of
the public good. This is because the husband knows that, if he paid his wife nothing, she
would nevertheless contribute something to the public good. Therefore, he does not have
to compensate her for that contribution.
Equal productivities hf = hm. In this case, both spouses spend the same amount of
time in household production at the non-cooperative threat point. Hence, both have the
same level of threat point utility, and so their utility at the bargaining outcome is equal -
















4.3 Divorce as threat point
In the event of a divorce, spouses live as singles in both periods. There are no transfers
































Lemma 2 (Divorce as threat point)
For equal household productivities hf = hm , both spouses devote the same amount of
time to the public good, g
f
D = gm
D, but their contributions are duplicated because the
good is now private. If the wife is more productive in the household than her husband




wife’s contribution to the public good is the same in the divorce as in the non-cooperative






As above, we can now calculate the transfers at the NBS, if divorce is the threat point,
again discriminating between spouses with equal and asymmetric productivities.





















































The middle term is positive, since because of her higher household productivity, the wife
consumes more eﬀective units hfg
f
D of the public good at the divorce threat point than
the husband does.
The sign of the ﬁrst and the last term depend on who devotes more time to household
production at the divorce threat point. Our assumptions about v(G) and hf=hm do not
directly answer this question, the signs of the ﬁrst and the last term are therefore unde-
termined. Still, the wife’s utility edge T f m is strictly positive, because she is better
endowed than the husband.
In the same way as in the preceding section, the transfer payment from husband to






[w   w  (1   g


























































D compensates the wife for her forgone earnings, while P 2
D makes up for part of
her wage loss due to the she time spent in household production. Spouses do not share
equally in the provision of the public good. In the divorce threat point, the wife’s higher
household productivity is an advantage, her better overall endowment enables her to claim
a higher share of marital resources in the NBS.







D), and the utility edge is zero. The transfer payments are the same as
in the non-cooperative threat point case, P 1
D = P 1
NC, P 2
D = P 2
NC. This is due to the fact
that, with equal productivities, both spouses make the same threat point contributions
15to the public good (their ﬁrst order conditions coincide) regardless of the threat point
speciﬁcation. The threat point speciﬁcation only matters if the wife has a comparative
advantage in household production. A symmetric couple bears the cost of the public
good provision in equal shares; the wife is not harmed because she is the sole public good
provider at the bargaining outcome. She is fully compensated by her husband.
4.4 Comparison of the two threat point speciﬁcations
In the NBS, spouses’ relative threat point utility levels determine the distribution of the
gains of cooperation within the couple. So to assess the importance of the distinction
between non-cooperative marriage and divorce, we have to look at who is better oﬀ in each
threat point.
Asymmetric productivities hf > hm. The husband is better oﬀ than the wife in the non-
cooperative threat point, while in the divorce threat point, spouses’ relative utility levels tilt
to her favour. With non-cooperative marriage as the threat point, the wife’s comparative
advantage in household production allows the husband to free-ride on her public good
provision. Since he can work for private consumption while she is busy providing the
family public good, his utility is higher than hers. The wife has exactly the same utility





D), while his utility in the non-cooperative threat point is strictly higher. He
consumes more of the public good, and, since he does not have to provide it, can devote
all of his time to his private consumption.
If, on the other hand, divorce is the threat point in bargaining, the wife is better oﬀ than
the husband. Since both are equally productive in market work, but she is more productive
in household production, her utility if single is higher than his. Her comparative advantage
in household production, that was a disadvantage in the non-cooperative marriage threat
point, is an asset in the divorce threat point.
At the NBS, this diﬀerence in threat point utilities translates into the transfers from
the husband to the wife. Table 1 summarizes these transfer payments. Both threat point
settings are broken down according to periods. In period 1, the wife receives more if
divorce, than if non-cooperative marriage were the threat point in bargaining. With non-
cooperative marriage as the threat point, the husband must only persuade the wife to lift
her contribution from g
f
NC to gf. He does not need to compensate her for a contribution
she would as well have made if there were no agreement (g
f
NC). But when divorced, he
cannot free-ride on her public good provision. Not only must he remunerate her for lifting
her contribution from g
f
D to gf, he also has to compensate her for half of the time he
would have contributed to the public good if divorced. Additionally, she is able to extract
an extra payment because she would enjoy more of the public good than he would. For
the same reasons, the transfer corresponding to the second period is higher in the divorce
16Table 1: Comparison of transfers P 1
i and P 2























case than in the case of non-cooperative marriage as the threat point.
Equal productivities hf = hm. If the spouses are equally endowed, they have the
same utility both in the divorce and in the non-cooperative threat point. Hence, the
utility edge is zero for both threat point speciﬁcations, and the spouses split the gains to
cooperation equally among them. The husband pays the wife a transfer of 1
2gf in the ﬁrst
and w(0)   w(gf) in the second period - he compensates her for half of the direct cost of
household production in the ﬁrst, and for half of the associated wage loss in the second
period. This outcome is “fair” in the sense that both partners share the cost of the public
good provision in equal parts. Although the wife contributes more to the public good, she
is fully compensated by her husband.
Thus, if the spouses had the possibility to choose between the two threat point speci-
ﬁcations, the husband would opt for non cooperative marriage if he had the comparative
advantage in market work, while the wife would prefer divorce in this case. A symmetric
couple would be indiﬀerent between the two options.
We summarize our results in the following
Proposition 2 (Eﬃciency under binding agreements)
Under binding agreements across periods, there is full specialization within the couple.
Eﬃciency is reached via monetary transfers, the sizes of which depend on the threat point
speciﬁcation. For both threat point speciﬁcations, the ﬁrst and the second period transfer
payments do not violate the husband’s budget constraints. A wife with a comparative
advantage in household production is better oﬀ (and the husband is correspondingly worse
oﬀ) if the threat point is divorce than if it is non-cooperative marriage. With equal pro-
ductivities, the choice of the threat point does not matter for intra-household distribution.
Proof. See Appendix.
5 Binding agreements are not feasible
In a more realistic version of our model, we suppose that the couple can commit to labour
supply and monetary transfers only within but not across periods. That is, at the beginning
of marriage, only monetary transfers in the ﬁrst period can be credibly assured, whilst
payments in the second period are determined at the beginning of period 2. This reﬂects
the fact that transfers within marriage typically cannot be legally enforced.
17In the model without binding agreements, the spouses play two successive Nash bar-
gaining games, one in each period. The outcome of the game in the second period depends
on the NBS of the ﬁrst period, because second period wage rates depend on ﬁrst period
labour supply. Since the spouses anticipate that their agreement in the ﬁrst period will
inﬂuence their agreement in the second period through their wage rates, this game com-
bines cooperative and non-cooperative elements. Ott (1992) solves this problem by ﬁrst
deriving a “conditional solution” for the second period for given wage rates and then using
the resulting indirect utility functions to ﬁnd the NBS in the ﬁrst period. We use a more
direct approach. We start by determining the transfer in the second period, and let the
couple then bargain on a subset of the original utility possibility set, that only contains
utility pairs that can be reached given the size of the second period transfer.
5.1 The second period
In the second period, there is no public good, no gains to specialization and therefore no
surplus to be divided. The second period payoﬀs of husband and wife for given contribu-















where P 2 denotes the transfer payment from the husband to the wife in the second period.
Spouses’ threat points are also determined by their ﬁrst period contributions gf and
gm. Note that in the second period, the distinction between the non-cooperative and the
divorce threat point becomes obsolete, since there is no public good provision. In the























it follows that the second period transfer without binding agreements is zero. In the
absence of a public good, the husband has no reason to share his private consumption with
his wife. If the second period transfer cannot be legally enforced, the wife will not trust
in her husband making such a payment, and she will change her actions in the ﬁrst period
accordingly.
185.2 The ﬁrst period
Let P 1 denote the transfer payment from the husband to the wife in the ﬁrst period. Given


























The constraint P 2 = 0 alters the couple’s UPF. The UPF of the original problem (as
illustrated in Figure 1) is a straight line whenever both spouses consume a strictly positive




f) + w  (2   g
f) + w(0) + w(g
f): (35)
Any movement along this line only redistributes private consumption between the spouses
while the provision level of the public good remains constant. At the north end of this line,
the wife gets all the private consumption, while at the south end the husband does. The
condition P 2 = 0 means that this redistribution is not possible for income earned in the
second period. Thus, the linear part of the UPF is shortened to the line between the point
where the wife controls all ﬁrst period labour income and the husband only consumes the
public good, and the point where the distribution is tilted to the other extreme and the
husband gets all ﬁrst period consumption. Figure 2 illustrates this modiﬁed UPF for the
area in which the wife controls all ﬁrst period consumption.16
The modiﬁed UPF starts at point A where the wife has the highest utility she can
obtain while providing the socially optimal level of the public good, c Uf = v(hfgf) + w 
(2   gf) + w(gf). Because of the constraint, the only way to increase her utility at that
point is to reduce her level of public good provision, boosting her private consumption.
Reducing gf below gf increases her utility up to point B where her contribution equals her
individual optimum g
f






D). At point B, the wife receives
all the couple’s private consumption in the ﬁrst period, and the consumption earned by
herself in the second period. Because she provides less than the socially optimal level of
the public good, the UPF of the model without binding agreements lies below the original
UPF for all Uf  c Uf. It is non-linear because in this segment of the UPF, utility can
only be redistributed between the spouses by varying gf (because the wife already controls
the couple’s entire ﬁrst period consumption, and second period consumption cannot be
redistributed), and the Ui are strictly concave in gf. The liquidity constraint preventing
second period income from being distributed means that the concave region of the UPF is
enlarged compared to the original problem.
16The north area of the modiﬁed UPF is not depicted because our assumption that the wife provides







d(Uf − Tf)(Um − Tm) = 0
Modiﬁed UPF
Figure 2: The modiﬁed UPF
Formally, the new segment of the UPF where the liquidity constraint is binding can be
described as follows. For all values of gf such that gf 2 [g
f
D;gf], spouses’ utilities along










f) + w(0); (37)
so the wife controls the couple’s entire ﬁrst period labour income, and each spouse controls
the second period labour income earned by themselves. The maximum utility the wife can
obtain given that P 2 = 0 is at the maximum of this segment of the UPF, at the point where
the public good provision level is the wife’s individual optimum: Uf = v(hfg
f





D). The wife’s lowest utility on this segment of the UPF is the point where she
provides the socially optimal level of the public good c Uf = v(hfgf)+w(2 gf)+w(gf).
Since the wife controls the couple’s entire ﬁrst period consumption in this area of the
UPF, spouses’ utility only depends on the provision level of the public good. Deﬁne the















Because Um(gf) is strictly increasing in 
, its inverse Um 1(um) = gf(um) exists. This




The function f(um) is strictly decreasing and strictly concave for all um 2 
.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is simple. From (36) it follows that the husband’s
utility increases in gf. The wife’s utility must be decreasing for gf > g
f
D because U(gf) is
concave and g
f
D is its maximum. Hence, f(um) must be a decreasing and strictly concave
function of um in this region.
The diﬀerence between the model with and without binding agreements is that the
straight segment of the UPF is shorter in the latter model, because only ﬁrst period
labour income can be freely distributed between spouses. If the NBS of the model with
binding agreements still lies on the straight segment of the UPF of the model without
binding agreements, the NBS remains unchanged if the assumption of binding agreements
is abolished. Put diﬀerently, if in the model with binding agreements the transfers P 1 and
P 2 satisfy the condition
P
1 + P
2  w; (39)
the NBS of the model without binding agreements is the same as in the model with
binding agreements. If this the case, the husband is rich enough in the ﬁrst period to
compensate the wife not only for her direct wage loss, but also for her lower wage rate in
the second period. He can aﬀord to compensate his wife in advance and thereby sidesteps
the commitment problem. Therefore, the level of public good provision is also eﬃcient.
This situation is depicted in Figure 2.
If, on the other hand, the transfers of the model with binding agreements exceed the
husband’s ﬁrst period budget, i.e. P 1 + P 2 > w, the original NBS cannot be reached in
the model without binding agreements and the outcome is not eﬃcient as illustrated in
Figure 3.













i ); i 2 D;NC; (40)
where T
f
i and T m
i denote the threat point utilities for the divorce and non-cooperative
threat point as determined in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. To ﬁnd the NBS, we maximize the
Nash product (40) subject to the constraints that the transfer P 1 in the ﬁrst period must
be feasible, P 1  w(1 gm), and that the transfer P 2 in the second period is zero, P 2 = 0,
as demanded by subgame perfection. If the constraint P 2 = 0 is binding, the new NBS
must lie on the new segment of the UPF and can be found by maximizing (40) on f(um).







d(Uf − Tf)(Um − Tm) = 0
Modiﬁed UPF
Figure 3: Ineﬃcient outcome due to the liquidity constraint
Proposition 3 (Binding agreements not feasible)
If the couple cannot commit to a transfer in the second period at the beginning of period
1, there will be no monetary transfers in period 2. Two cases can be distinguished:
1. The payments determined in section 4 satisfy the condition P 1 + P 2  w. The
husband fully compensates the wife in the ﬁrst period, and the outcome of the model
is unaﬀected by the absence of binding agreements.
2. The husband cannot aﬀord to fully compensate the wife in period 1, the payments
determined in section 4 are such that P 1 + P 2 > w. The wife receives the couple’s
entire ﬁrst period consumption. The ﬁrst order condition for the wife’s public good
provision when binding agreements are not feasible, g
f
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In this case, the wife’s contribution to the public good, g
f
NB is increasing in the
husband’s threat point utility and decreasing in the wife’s.
Proof. See Appendix.
22Table 2: Comparison of ﬁrst order conditions
Situation FOC
Eﬃciency w   w0(gf) = 2  hfv0(hfgf)




















If the constraint P 2 = 0 is binding, spouses’ threat point utilities not only inﬂuence
the distribution of resources within the couple, but also the eﬃciency of the public good
provision. Changes in his and her threat point utility push g
f
NB in diﬀerent directions. To
see why, note that in the NBS, the wife’s utility must increase if her threat point utility
goes up. Since the wife’s utility is decreasing in gf on f(um), it is clear that g
f
NB must go
down with an increase in the wife’s threat point. Because the wife’s utility is at least as
high in the divorce threat point as it is in the non-cooperative threat point, g
f
NB is at least
as large if non-cooperative marriage is the the threat point in bargaining as it is if spouses
use divorce as the disagreement point.
This ineﬃciency is entirely due to the lack of a commitment device and is robust to the
speciﬁcation of the payoﬀ function (in contrast to the full specialization eﬃciency result
of Section 4.1). In fact, assuming more sophisticated payoﬀ function would in most cases
increase the probability of an ineﬃcient outcome.
Corollary 1
If binding agreements are not feasible and the constraint P 2 = 0 is binding, the wife’s
contribution to the public good g
f
NB lies between her individual optimum g
f
D and the







Her individually optimal contribution g
f
NB must lie in this interval because we found
it by maximizing the Nash product on f(um) which is deﬁned on this interval. The ﬁrst
inequality stems from the fact that the wife would contribute g
f
D without a transfer of w
from her husband, the second is due to the concavity of f(um) and the fact that P 2 = 0 is
binding.
5.3 Policy implications
The ineﬃciently low provision of the family public good in our model arises because the
spouse specialized on a labour market career (in our model the husband) cannot credibly
commit to compensate his or her partner for foregone career opportunities later in life.
The most direct way to eliminate this ineﬃciency would hence be for the husband to sign
a binding contract at the beginning of marriage and therein pledge himself to compensate
his wife later. If that were possible, our model would predict an eﬃcient provision level
23of the public good. Unfortunately, such contracts are generally not legally enforceable. In
this section, we quickly review other policies that could mitigate the ineﬃciency. If we
imagine the family public good to be the quantity and quality of children, it might also be
in the government’s interest to step in.
Borrowing and saving
One way for the husband to avoid the commitment problem is to “pay” his wife up front to
compensate her for her loss of second period earnings in the ﬁrst period. This is what he
does in our model if his ﬁrst period income is big enough for such a payment. Empirically,
we observe substantial returns to labour market experience. Given the importance of
seniority as a determinant of the hourly wage rate, it seems unlikely that a young man
should be able compensate his wife for a lower wage rate (that she has to suﬀer throughout
her entire working life) before starting a family.
He could however try to obtain the necessary funds on the capital market. We believe
that it would be very diﬃcult if not impossible for the average husband to take out a
loan of the necessary magnitude to compensate his wife ex ante, even more so if he has
young children and needs credit for other things, like buying a house. Another theoretical
possibility would be for the husband to issue a debt certiﬁcate to his wife at the beginning
of marriage, payable at a later date. This would allow him to avoid the capital market,
borrowing from his wife instead. However, the signing of debt certiﬁcates in new couples
is nearly unheard of. Also, this would create a new moral hazard incentive problem both
for the wife (an unconditional payment is agreed for future services) and the husband (he
agrees to share future earnings that depend on eﬀort). Therefore we think that ruling out
borrowing and saving in our model aptly describes the situation of young partnerships.
Divorce law and alimony
While the distribution of resources within marriage is generally not regulated, monetary
transfers after a divorce are stipulated by law in most industrialized countries. Indeed, the
existence of divorce legislation that incorporates alimony payments contingent on the time
spent child on rearing suggests that the law acknowledges the inadmissibility of binding
agreements within marriage over long periods of time. It assures compensation for foregone
labour market earnings in the event of divorce that can not be guaranteed in an intact
marriage.
Since divorce law determines the distribution of resources only when divorced, it in-
ﬂuences our model only if the threat point is assumed to be divorce. With an alimony
payment P D
2 assured to her by law, the wife’s threat point utility in the second period rises
from w(gf) to w(gf) + P D
2 , while the husband’s is diminished by the same amount. By
plugging this into the objective function (32) it can easily be seen that the second period
24transfer without binding agreements is the compensation that would be due to the wife
in the event of divorce, P D
2 . This extends the part of the UPF where the socially optimal
amount of the public is produced, and hence increases the probability that the NBS lies
on it. Ideally, the legal alimony payment should depend on the time spent out of the
labour market to bring it as close as possible to the original P 2 that is probably unknown
to policy makers, but can be estimated. Also, divorce legislation should not be changed
quickly, so individuals can rely on future payments. Observe that in the context of our
model, spousal support legislation also beneﬁts the husbands (at least ex-ante).
Public child care
The ineﬃciency within our model originates in the couple’s inability to eﬀectively exploit
the gains to specialization, that household production and learning by doing on the labour
market oﬀer them. Instead of trying to eliminate the lack of commitment, policy mak-
ers could also try to get rid of the need for specialization within families and promote
specialization between households instead, since child care professionals do not suﬀer from
foregone labour market experience.17 The public provision of child care eliminates the need
for specialization within couples and thereby avoids its harmful eﬀect on the spouse who
falls short of acquiring labour market experience. Many industrialized countries heavily
subsidize childcare facilities, that is, many governments provide child care as a beneﬁt in
kind. Translated into our framework, this amounts to an exogenous increase in G. Because
of quasilinear utility, the couple withdraws their private contribution in response to the
public provision of G in order to maintain the level hfg
f
NB. All private contributions have
to be crowded out before the total amount of G begins to rise, but a suﬃciently generous
subsidy to child care facilities can indeed improve eﬃciency within our framework.
Because it enables young mothers to focus more on their careers, public provision of
child care reduces not only direct, but also indirect costs of children, and can therefore
stimulate fertility.18
With respect to intra-household distribution, the public provision of child care is to
the advantage of the wife in the non-cooperative marriage threat point. It crowds out
her contribution, enabling her to work more on the labour market like her husband. So,
the introduction of free public child care facilities tilts intra- household distribution to the
17In fact, we would expect the emergence of private markets for child care. But market provided child
care has to use taxed labour while family provided care is tax free. Which one is cheaper overall depends
on the tax system and the importance of learning by doing (which is likely to diﬀer between individuals).
We think that tax wedges are important enough in most industrialized countries to inhibit the emergence
of legal and completely unsubsidized markets for childcare, that oﬀer prices aﬀordable to all families (for
a similar argument, see Konrad and Lommerud, 1995).
18Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that countries that generously provide child care like France and
Sweden have higher birth rates than countries that concentrate on monetary transfers to support families,
like Germany and Austria.
25wife’s favor, if the threat point is non-cooperative marriage. With a divorce threat point,
both spouses equally beneﬁt from free child care in the threat point, so intra-household
distribution in the ﬁrst period remains unchanged. The wife of course beneﬁts in both
threat point scenarios from her higher wage rate in the second period.
6 Conclusions
This paper highlights that, as in many other areas of economics, commitment problems
do exist within the household and that they may cause ineﬃcient outcomes. Following
sensible assumptions about the eﬀect of career interruptions on wage rates, we illustrate
with a simple two period model that it is eﬃcient that only one spouse contributes to a
family public good like housework or child care, while the other spouse concentrates on
her/his career. This is also true if husband and wife are ex-ante equally productive in
household and market work. Specialization arises endogenously as a consequence of the
provision of the family public good in our model, and not in its strategic anticipation or
because of an exogenous productivity asymmetry, as in most models in the literature.
But this specialization within the family can result in ineﬃcient household allocations:
due to lack of commitment devices, too little of the joint household public good may be
provided. If the spouse specialized in market work (who is typically the husband) can
credibly commit her/himself to share the fruits of her/his labour market experience with
their partner later in life, the couple achieves the eﬃcient provision level of the public
good. But, if such an intertemporal commitment is not feasible, the wife withdraws part
of her contribution to the public good below the socially optimal level. She anticipates
that, once there is no more public good production (e. g. because children have grown up
and left home) the husband has no reason to make any payments to her. This ineﬃciency
is a direct consequence of the liquidity constraint faced by the couple, and is not caused
by the spouses trying to manipulate their threat points in later stages, as in other models
in the literature.
We devote special attention to the speciﬁcation of the threat point that is used in the
NBS, since there is yet no consensus in the literature on what is a sensible threat point in a
family bargaining setting. We ﬁnd that the choice of the threat point does have important
implications for the distribution of resources within the couple. If the threat point is
non-cooperative behaviour within marriage, the husband can still enjoy the wife’s public
good provision, which is impossible if the couple is divorced. Hence, the spouse that has
the comparative advantage in public good provision beneﬁts from a switch of the threat
point from non-cooperative marriage to divorce. Which threat point is more likely to be
used in marital bargaining can only be determined by empirical studies that can clearly
discriminate between the two; unfortunately, to date we are not aware of such a study.
However, divorce is unlikely to be the threat point in marital bargaining if terminating a
26marriage is not really an option in the social environment of a couple. We may speculate
that, as divorce becomes more common in the Western world, wives are more and more
able to credibly threat with divorce in marital disputes.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 (Eﬃciency).
It may be optimal that one spouse fully specializes on market work, so we have to maximize
the joint intertemporal utility U(gf;gm) subject to the non-negativity constraints gf  0
and gm  0. The Kuhn-Tucker ﬁrst order conditions are
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f = 0; g
f  0; (43)
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m = 0; g
m  0: (44)
Our Inada assumptions regarding the spouses’ preferences imply that the solution to the
joint maximization problem (6) involves a strictly positive provision level of the family
public good  G > 0, so we cannot obtain gf = gm = 0. They also imply that both gf < 1
and gm < 1. Thus, it suﬃces to show that only one spouse contributes to the family public
good and that, in the case of asymmetric productivities, the only contributor is the spouse
with the higher productivity.
Joint utility U can be expressed as a function of gf and  G, since gm = 1
hm  G  1
hmhfgf:
U(g
f;  G) = F(g
f;  G) + w(g
f) + w(  G   g
f); (45)
where F(gf;  G) := w  (1   gf) + w  (1   gm(  G)) + 2v(hfgf + hmgm(  G)).
Consider ﬁrst the case of equal productivities, hf = hm. The contributions gf and
gm in the term F() are perfect substitutes and thus spouses’ individual contributions are
irrelevant as long as their sum equals  G. Therefore, for a given  G, U(gf;  G) is maximized
whenever the sum w(gf)+w(  G gf) is maximized. Since w is a convex function, this sum
is maximized when the values gf and gm =  G   gf are on the border of the interval at
a corner solution where gf =  G and gm = 0 or, alternatively, gm =  G and gf = 0.
Consider now the case hf > hm. By the same argument, the sum w(gf)+w(  G gf) is
maximized at the corners of the interval, that is at gf =  G;gm = 0 and gm =  G;gf = 0.
But gf and gm are no perfect substitutes in the term 2v(hfgf + hmgm) any more. If
hf > hm, the term 2v(hfgf + hmgm) is greater if gf =  G than if gm =  G. Therefore, if
hf > hm, the only eﬃcient outcome is the corner solution gf =  G and gm = 0. QED.
27Proof of Lemma 1 (Non-cooperative marriage).
For each spouse, the ﬁrst and second order conditions (FOC and SOC) are
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NC) < 0 for a maximum.







NC, and without loss of generality let g
f
NC > gm
NC. Then, because of the convexity
of w(gi), the RHS of (15) (the wife’s ﬁrst order condition) is larger than the RHS of (16)
(the husband’s). Since the LHS of both conditions are equal, equality can only hold for one
spouse. If it holds for the husband, the concavity of v(hfg
f
NC + hmgm
NC) would induce the
wife to withdraw part of her contribution, since her marginal cost would otherwise exceed
her marginal gain from the public good. If it holds for the wife, the husband would increase









Now consider the case hf > hm. First, observe that g
f
NC 6= gm
NC. If they were equal,
both conditions could not hold simultaneously, because the marginal utility from the public
good has to be the same for both spouses. Then, assume that gm
NC 2 (g
f
NC;1]. If this were
true, w   w0(gm
NC) > w   w0(g
f
NC) because of the convexity of w(), and both conditions
cannot hold because 1
hm > 1
hf. Finally, consider gm
NC 2 (0;g
f























Clearly, the LHS of (48) is larger than the LHS of (47). If both conditions hold with
equality we have: w   w0(g
f
NC) > w   w0(gm




Because w(gi) is decreasing and convex, this implies that gm
NC > g
f
NC, which leads to a
contradiction. Thus, both spouses cannot be in an interior solution, and gm
NC = 0.
What remains to be shown is that g
f
NC < gf. First, observe that g
f
NC 6= gf, for if it
were, the RHS of (10) and (48) would coincide, resulting in their LHS to be equal as well
which clearly cannot be the case. To see that g
f
NC < gf, multiply the RHS of (10) by two.





f) < 2  (w   w
0(g
f)): (49)
28By (48), this condition holds with equality at gf = g
f
NC, so if gf < g
f
NC, it would have to
be increased to equal g
f
NC. Increasing gf reduces both sides of the condition, but the ﬁrst
derivative of the RHS must be larger than the ﬁrst derivative of the LHS since Ui(gf;gm)
is globally concave and (9) has to hold in gf. Therefore increasing gf would would shrink
the RHS of (49) slower than the LHS, aggravating the equality. Hence, gf cannot be
smaller than or equal to g
f
NC, and must therefore be larger. QED.




D if hf = hm follows from the ﬁrst order conditions (23) and (24). For the
case of asymmetric productivities, one cannot say whether a higher household productivity
leads to more or less time spent on household work. The ﬁrst order conditions only allow
us to state that the “expenditure” hfg
f
D on G by the more productive spouse must be larger
than the “expenditure” of the less productive spouse hmgm
D. That the wife’s contribution
to the public good is the same in both threat point speciﬁcations is obvious since the ﬁrst
order conditions (15) and (23) coincide for both threat point speciﬁcations. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Eﬃciency under binding agreements).
The NBS is eﬃcient by construction, so by Proposition 1 there is full specialization within
the couple. Lemmas 1 and 2 and Table 1 imply that, if the wife has a comparative
advantage in household production, she is better oﬀ (and the husband is correspondingly
worse oﬀ) if the threat point is divorce than if it is non-cooperative marriage, and that
with equal productivities, the choice of the threat point does not matter for intra-household
distribution. It only remains to show that, for both threat point speciﬁcations, the ﬁrst
and the second period transfer payments do not violate the husband’s budget constraints.
Consider ﬁrst the individual budget constraints when the threat point is non-cooperative
marriage. In the ﬁrst period, the husband has an income of w, which is greater than the
ﬁrst period transfer 1
2w  (gf   g
f
NC), since gf   g
f
NC < 1. His second period income is
w(0), which again is greater than the second period transfer 1
2(w(g
f
NC)   w(gf)), since
both g
f
NC > 0 and gf > 0, therefore w(0) > w(g
f





For the divorce threat point, direct calculation shows that if T
f
D + T m
D < Uf + Um,
then PD < Um. QED.
Proof of Lemma 3 (f(um) is decreasing and strictly concave).







 such that um
1 > um
2 . Since um 1(um) = gf(um) is strictly increasing, gf(um
1 ) >
gf(um
2 ). uf(gf) must be strictly decreasing for gf 2 (g
f





29the maximum of this function. Hence, Uf(gf(um
1 )) < Uf(gf(um
2 )), which is equivalent to
stating that f(Um
1 ) < f(Um
2 ).
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1 > um
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3 ) < 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m





3 ) < g
f
3. Moreover, since Uf(gf) is strictly decreasing for gf 2 (g
f
D;gf),
(51) implies that Uf(gf(um
3 )) > Uf(gf(um
1 )) + (1   )Uf(gf(um
2 )), which, since f(um) =
Uf(gf(um)), establishes that f(um) is strictly concave. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3 (Binding agreements not feasible).
If the sum of the payments determined in section 4 is lower than the husband’s ﬁrst period
income, P 1 + P 2  w, the constraint P 2 = 0 is not binding in the model without binding
agreements - the husband can aﬀord to pay the wife both P 1 and P 2 in the ﬁrst period.
Consequently, it does not inﬂuence the maximization problem, which establishes case 1.
Now consider the case where the parameters of the model are such that the solution
of the original problem, as discussed in section 4, incorporates payments from husband to
wife that exceed the husband’s ﬁrst period income. Then, all utility pairs on the UPF
where Uf 2 [Uf; c Uf) are of the form described in (37) and (36), and only depend on gf
(because the wife controls all income that can be distributed between the spouses). Um











m   w(0)): (52)






















To ﬁnd the NBS, we have to maximize the Nash product, (Uf   T f)(Um   T m) on the
UPF, Uf(um) = f(um). This is equivalent to maximizing
 
f(um)   T f
(Um   T m) over
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To establish that g
f
NB decreases with a rise in T f, ﬁx the NBS of a bargaining problem that







on the RHS of condition (41). Since the RHS is positive, the LHS must now be larger
than the RHS. To arrive at the new NBS, g
f
NB must be lifted or reduced. Increasing
g
f
NB results in v0(hfg
f
NB) diminishing faster than  w0(g
f
NB) by the concavity condition (9).
Also, Uf(g
f












NB) Tm. Both eﬀects aggravate the inequality. Hence, g
f
NB must be reduced to arrive
at the new NBS. To prove that g
f
NB rises with an increase in T m, reverse this argument.
QED.
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